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Abstract
Gibrat’s Law of proportionate eﬀect, as applied to ﬁrms, states that the growth rate of a ﬁrm is inde-
pendent of its size. Empirical work on ﬁrm dynamics ﬁnds crucial deviations from Gibrat’s Law such
as smaller ﬁrms growing faster than larger ﬁrms (Evans, 1987, and Hall, 1987), a negative relationship
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Law a close, but imperfect approximation of ﬁrm size distributions and seeks to determine potential
sources of cross-industry variation. Here, we employ an extension of the Ericson-Pakes (1995) theoretical
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Law uncovered in the empirical literature.
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Gibrat’s Law of proportionate eﬀect, as applied to ﬁrms, states that the growth rate of a ﬁrm is
independent of its size. Empirical work on ﬁrm dynamics ﬁnds crucial deviations from Gibrat’s
Law such as smaller ﬁrms growing faster than larger ﬁrms (Evans, 1987 and Hall, 1987), a negative
relationship between the variance of growth rates and size (Dunne and Hughes, 1994), and ﬁrst-
order positive autocorrelation in the growth rates (Kumar, 1995). Moreover, the type of deviation
from Gibrat’s Law varies across industries. This paper contributes to our understanding of the
forces that make Gibrat’s Law a close, but imperfect approximation of ﬁrm size distributions and
seeks to determine potential sources of cross-industry variation. Here, we employ an extension of
the Ericson-Pakes (1995) theoretical framework that allows for ﬁrm growth developed by Laincz
(2004a). By varying key priors, the simulations demonstrate potential sources for the various,
and sometimes conﬂicting, results on Gibrat’s Law uncovered in the empirical literature.
Studies on the ﬁrm size distribution and Gibrat’s Law to date have been the province of
empiricists. While we can write down various reduced form models, as in McCloughan (1995), to
reproduce many of the statistical facts, little of the work has been guided by a formal structural
model. In Caves’ (1998) survey on the recent empirical ﬁndings in industrial organization, he
states, “Although the importance of these facts for economic behavior and performance is manifest,
their development has not been theory-driven.” This paper seeks to take a step towards ﬁlling this
gap. Thus, the ﬁrst, and basic questions we ask are how well does the dynamic industry model
reproduce Gibrat’s Law and how well does it match the deviations uncovered in the literature.
We show that the model can approximate these results when testing the simulated output using
the techniques of the empirical literature.
In addition, a more recent literature uncovers signiﬁcant cross-industry variation in the higher
moment of the ﬁrm size distribution. Machado and Mata (2000) ﬁnd that industry characteristics
such as technological orientation and capital-intensity are signiﬁcantly related to the skewness.
1Lotti and Santerelli (2004) show how the distribution of a new cohorts diﬀers across diﬀerent
industries and over time. Audretsch et al. (2004) present evidence suggesting that at least
some segments of the service industry may ﬁt Gibrat’s Law in its strong form. We explore how
key structural parameters alter the higher moments of the ﬁrm size distribution to understand
cross-industry diﬀerences.
After brieﬂy reviewing the lengthy empirical literature on Gibrat’s Law in the next section,
section 3 presents the basic model. In section 4 we compare the results of a baseline simulation
to the basic predictions and deviations of Gibrat’s Law. Section 5, which is incomplete, will
explore how varying key parameters alters the ﬁrm size distribution and compare these results
with the literature that looks at a cross-section of industries. Section 6 summarizes the results
and indicates avenues for future work.
2 Gibrat’s Law and Empirical Findings
Following on the seminal works of Hart and Prais (1956) and Ijiri and Simon (1964), the indus-
trial organization literature devoted much energy into exploring the statistical regularity known
as Gibrat’s Law as it applies to the ﬁrm size distribution. Gibrat’s Law yields a log-normal
distribution of ﬁrm sizes. Growth in the size of ﬁrm i from one period to the next is given as:
xi(t)=x
β
i (t − 1)exp[ui(t)], β>0 (1)
where ui(t) v iid N(µ,σ2).D e ﬁning yi(t)=l nxi(t), then:
yi(t)=βyi(t − 1) + ui(t). (2)
When β =1we have Gibrat’s Law wherein the growth rate of a ﬁrm is independent of its initial
size. Empirical work on the ﬁrm size distribution ﬁnds that this characterization is a close, but
imperfect proxy for the data. The earliest work on Gibrat’s Law only had data available for
large ﬁrms. Hart and Prais (1956), for example, included only ﬁrms listed on the London Stock
2Exchange between 1885 and 1950. They found that Gibrat’s Law provided a good statistical
approximation for the distribution. Simon and Bonini (1958) found similar results for large US
ﬁrms.
If β 6=1 ,t h e nﬁrm growth is not independent of its size. In McCloughan’s simulations, he
draws on Prais (1975) and uses 0.75, 0.95, and 1.05 as alternative values for β. Figures 1-4 display
the results of simulating (2) to illustrate why this simple statistical process has such appeal.1
T h ep r o c e d u r es t a r t s5 0ﬁrms at equal sizes and runs for 50 periods. The process is run 20 times
and the reported results are based on the average of the 20 simulations.
Figure 1 is the outcome of Gibrat’s Law in its strong form with the mean growth rate set
to zero. The distribution is roughly symmetric with a skewness coeﬃc i e n tj u s tb e l o wz e r oo f
-0.035 and the index of kurtosis is 2.84 (0 and 3 for the normal distribution, respectively). When
β<1, ﬁrms revert to the average size for the industry. Figures 2 and 3 display this process.
Notably the distributions become skewed to the right with coeﬃcients equal to 0.11 and 0.17.
The distributions’ kurtosis is hardly changed in these simulations, 2.83 and 2.88. When β>1
(Figure 4) ﬁrm sizes diverge and the skewness remains to the right, but at a smaller magnitude
of 0.08 while the kurtosis rises to 3.06 indicating a distribution slightly more peaked (leptokurtic)
than the normal distribution.
Comparing these results to empirical estimates based on a large sample of ﬁrms, Hart and
Oulton (1996) measure ﬁrms by employees, net sales, and net assets. In all cases they ﬁnd the
distribution is skewed right, with estimates ranging from 0.19 to 0.75, and leptokurtic with values
from 4.58 to 6.20. However, they argue the deviations should not be compared with the extreme
of matching the normal distribution exactly and that the close approximation justiﬁes its use in
empirical work.
Our task is rather diﬀerent. We are speciﬁcally interested in the deviations themselves. We
1 We follow McCloughan’s (1995) simulation methodology. Our results nearly match his reported results in
Table II, p. 413.
3want to construct a sensible model of optimizing ﬁrm behavior that can both approximate the
distribution and provide us with a tool to understand the deviations and, moreover, cross-industry
diﬀerences. Before turning to the model, we look at the literature that explicitly rejects the strong
form of Gibrat’s Law.
Mansﬁeld (1962) was perhaps the ﬁrst to explicitly deal with the problems that entry and
exit present for the interpretation of Gibrat’s Law. Speciﬁcally, since exiting ﬁrms eﬀectively
have a growth rate of -100%, does Gibrat’s Law hold for all ﬁrms, only the survivors, or for ﬁrms
exceeding a size threshold such as minimum eﬃcient scale? Of the three, he found that the latter
interpretation ﬁt his data the best using a χ2 test on the lognormality of the distributions for each
of his industries in each time period. In growth size regressions, Mansﬁeld found that while in
t h ee n t i r es a m p l eo fﬁrms and survivors only, ﬁrms grow less than proportionally. If one considers
large ﬁrms only, the mean growth rate is independent of size. He still concludes that Gibrat’s law
does not hold for either of the versions considered due to the fact that even for the latter case the
variance of growth rates decreases with size.
Subsequent empirical analysis largely conﬁrmed Mansﬁeld’s initial foray into the subject. The
studies were of two main types: testing the moments of the ﬁrm size distribution against log-
normality and utilizing growth-size regressions. In the latter, using more advanced econometric
techniques to deal with heteroscedasticity and sample selection bias, Hall (1987) and Evans (1987)
ﬁnd that Gibrat’s Law generally holds for large ﬁrms, but not for the entire population. They
uncover a negative relationship between size and growth. Dunne and Hughes (1994) expand the
question looking at the size-growth relationship across small, medium, and large ﬁrms. They ﬁnd
that while size evolves proportionally for medium and large ﬁrms, small ﬁrms’ growth rates have
higher variance and tend to decrease with size.
Another set of growth regression studies focused on the persistence of deviations of ﬁrm size
from the mean, which would implied biased estimates for β. Singh and Whittington (1975) and
Kumar (1985) found evidence for serial correlation in the growth rates of ﬁrms supporting the
4variant of Gibrat’s Law proposed in Ijiri and Simon (1964). Hart and Oulton (1996) use a
Galton-Markov process, such as proposed by Chesher (1979), and ﬁnd that ﬁrm growth is a mean
reverting process, and that, on average, small ﬁrms grow faster than large ones. Kumar (1985)
conﬁrms the previous ﬁndings rejecting the strong form of Gibrat’s Law, by showing that the
earlier conclusions were robust to correcting for autocorrelation of growth rates.
We want to understand how key structural parameters aﬀect the ﬁrm size distribution and their
relationship with Gibrat’s Law. Recent literature suggests signiﬁcant cross-industry variation in
the evolution of the ﬁrm size distribution. Santarelli and Lotti (2004) look at the evolution of the
size distribution of new ﬁrms in bread, oﬃce machinery, radio and TV equipment, and footwear.
Over a period of ﬁve years most of the distributions approach the log normal distribution, how-
ever, the more technologically oriented industries achieved the lognormal faster. Footwear, also
converged to the log-normal relatively quickly and the authors attribute this to the agglomeration
eﬀects. Bread, however, remained bimodal and did not completely covergence by the end of the
time period analyzed.
Audretsch et al. (2004) ﬁnd evidence that services may exhibit diﬀerent distributional proper-
ties than manufacturing, the main focus of the empirical literature to date. Looking at the Dutch
hospitality sector they ﬁnd that growth is independent of size, whereas the majority of studies
focusing on manufacturing ﬁnd the negative growth-size relation discussed above. Machado and
Mata (2000) use quantile regressions to examine the eﬀect of industry characteristics on diﬀerent
portions of the distribution for Portuguese data. While their results are mixed for some charac-
teristics and distribution measures, they ﬁnd that impact of industry characteristics on skewness
is the most stable over time. Both technology measures and the rate of growth in an industry
reduce the skewness of the distribution, while turbulence increases it.
53T h e M o d e l
To capture the forces that aﬀect ﬁrm size distribution in a structural model, we apply a
variant of the Ericson and Pakes (1995) model discussed in Laincz (2004a). The modiﬁcation
allows for continually falling marginal costs through process R&D such that we can discuss both
ﬁrm and industry growth rates. That enables us to perform analogous growth-size tests on the
resulting simulated data.
We specify an industry with a ﬁnite set of imperfect substitutes such that one of the common
drawbacks of the Ericson-Pakes framework does not apply. Because the state space for a single
industry can be very large, it limits the total number of ﬁrms that the computational algorithm can
handle, often to no more than about 10 ﬁrms. In order to generate a cross-sectional distribution
with a reasonable number of observations, our industry is characterized by a ﬁnite set of imperfect
substitutes, but each good is produced by a Cournot oligopoly. We solve for the dynamics
associated with each substitute separately, thinking of each as a highly disaggregated good and
then aggregate across the varieties. Thus, one can think of each good as being deﬁned at a 7-digit
level, for example, and the aggregation taking place at a less detailed industry level such as 4 or
5 digits in the SIC or NAIC codes. The result of our approach yields industries averaging about
20 ﬁrms at any one time.
By specifying independent products within the same broader market, we bridge the literature
between the earlier stochastic models and the more recent literature devoted to strategic inter-
action. The older literature presumed that a market contained a series of isolated opportunities
and assigned exogenous probabilities that these opportunities would be undertaken by either in-
cumbents or new entrants. As Sutton (1997) states, the assumption is “crude,” however, “. .
. most conventionally deﬁned industries exhibit both some strategic interdependence within sub-
markets, and some degree of independence across submarkets.”2 Our characterization allows for
2 Sutton (1997), p. 49.
6strategic interdependence within each product market, but independence across products within
the industry.
3.1 The Industry
We characterize the industry as producing intermediate goods sold into a perfectly competitive
ﬁnal goods sector. Firms producing the intermediate goods choose quantity produced, investment
in R&D, and whether to exit or not, if they are currently active in the product market, or enter
if they are not currently active. The dynamic equilibrium is a Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium
which imposes that decisions are functions only of the current state which is the current market
structure.
3.1.1 The Product Markets
Demand for intermediate goods comes from a perfectly competitive ﬁnal goods sector with a CRS











βm =1 . (3)
Each xmt is the input from subsector m,w h e r em denotes the products within the industry Within
each subsector, multiple ﬁrms engage in Cournot competition providing a homogenous good to
gain market share. We allow the β’s to vary across substitutes to generate greater variation in
market shares.4 The Cobb-Douglas framework also ﬁxes the share that the ﬁnal goods sector
spends on each intermediate product. Normalizing the price of the output good to unity, the





3 We could analagously think of (3) as the utility function for a consumer and apply the framework to imperfectly
competitive ﬁnal goods producers.
4 An obvious extension to our framework would be to endogenize the shares across the goods. This could
be accomplished by changing the ﬁnal good production function to Dixit-Stiglitz as in Laincz (2004b). That
extension introduces a more complicated problem to solve without adding much in the way of additional insights
for the present inquiry.
7Firms producing intermediate goods at any given time have a technology for production of
intermediate goods where the marginal costs are constant although they vary between ﬁrms. All
ﬁrms are assumed to face constant ﬁxed costs which do not vary either with time or across ﬁrms.








qkm − MCkmqkm − f (5)
where Pm i st h ep r i c eo ft h ei n t e r m e d i a t eg o o d ,qkm is the quantity output of ﬁrm k producing
product m, MCkm are the marginal costs for ﬁrm k,a n df is ﬁxed costs. The implicit production
function is linear in the input good with a coeﬃcient equal to the inverse of the marginal cost.
Price is a function of share of total demand for that subsector’s good which is given by βmY .D u e
to the presence of ﬁxed costs, some ﬁrms may choose not to produce. The choice of produce or
not to produce (also exit or not exit) is assumed made prior to quantity decisions and all ﬁrms
know the decisions of their rivals to ensure uniqueness of the solution.
We focus on one submarket to illustrate the model in the discussion that follows. Let N∗
m
be the number of ﬁrms producing qmn > 0. The Cournot-Nash equilibrium outcomes yield the
























and proﬁts for ﬁrm k are given by
π∗
km =m a x
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8Equation (9) simply states that a ﬁrm will choose not to produce if their marginal costs are too
high relative to its competitors.
The Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation simpliﬁes solutions to the Cournot-Nash equilibrium tremen-
dously. Speciﬁcally, it generates a Cournot solution for the intermediate goods ﬁrms in which
proﬁts are homogenous of degree zero in the vector of costs across ﬁrms. Thus, a proportional
change in the vector of marginal costs leaves proﬁts the same despite falling marginal costs. More-
over, it allows for continuously declining marginal costs as opposed to the Ericson-Pakes framework
where marginal costs are restricted to take on values in a ﬁnite set. The reason is that for any
given vector of marginal costs, once the policy functions specifying R&D expenditures, entry, and
exit are determined, these decisions will not vary provided the vector of marginal costs changes
proportionally. Hence, policy functions for a ﬁnite subset of possible vectors of marginal costs
is suﬃcient to characterize the long-run equilibrium as marginal costs continuously decline with
process innovation.
However, the functional form of the demand system does create a problem in the case of
an intermediate goods industry containing a monopolist. Because the price elasticity of market
demand is unity, the monopolist’s solution is not well deﬁned. We assume that there is a minimum
scale level of operations for a monopoly.5 Let q be the minimum amount that a monopoly must
produce in order to engage in the market. The assumption has two eﬀects. First, it immediately
deﬁnes a solution for the monopoly problem with a positive level of output while still providing
the monopoly with incentives to invest in order to lower its costs. Furthermore, provided q
is suﬃciently small, there remain strong incentives for ﬁrms to strive to become monopolists.
The minimum scale chosen, while small enough to generate large monopoly proﬁts, is such that
in equilibrium ﬁr m sa l w a y sh a v es u ﬃciently strong incentives to remain in the market or enter
5 There are other assumptions that could be made here instead, but do not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the results. For
example, it would be more natural to think of the minimum scale assumption applying to all ﬁrms whether or
not there is a monopoly. This assumption, while more plausible, only complicates the Cournot-Nash solution by
changing the corner solution for output from 0 to q for aﬀected ﬁrms. Moreover, as noted in footnote 4, Dixit-
Stiglitz technology is a viable alternative that yields the same homogeneity of degree zero property, but it does not
create a poorly deﬁned monopoly problem.
9the market when the number of ﬁrms is small. Those incentives are discussed in the next
section. Given that true monopolies without regulatory protection are exceedingly rare, the
focus on markets where the probability of a monopoly emerging is quite small seems realistic and
appropriate for the questions at hand.
3.1.2 Evolution of Market Structure
The number of ﬁrms operating in each product market and their relative levels of marginal cost
determine the market structure at any point in time. The market structure evolves through
p r o c e s sR & Dw h i c hl o w e r saﬁrm’s marginal cost when R&D is successful. A stochastic process
governs success where the probability of innovation rises at a decreasing rate with the amount of
investment.
We track the level of marginal costs by accounting for the number of innovations a ﬁrm has
available at time t and denote it as ikmt. The total number of innovations is the sum of the
publicly available innovations for product m, labelled Imt,a n de a c hﬁrm’s private innovations,
ipkmt,
ikmt = Imt + ipkmt. (10)
Private innovations of incumbents diﬀuse to the public stock at a constant rate, δ.T h u s , Imt
increments by one with probability δ in every period. We interpret δ as the strength of lead-time,
secrecy, and patent protection within the industry. In section 5, we explore how this diﬀusion rate
alters the observed ﬁrm size distribution.
The constantly growing public stock of innovations allows potential entrants to remain viable.
Completely new ﬁrms in a particular market do not have to invest to learn all of the innovations
that have taken place in an industry since the beginning of time. Rather, we assume that most
innovations are in the form of readily available public knowledge, while more recent innovations
are held privately by incumbent ﬁrms. Existing ﬁrms have access to all of the publicly available
technological innovations and have discovered some new ones through process R&D which is
10temporarily private information. It is through this process of knowledge diﬀusion that industries
are prevented from becoming permanently monopolized.6
A new entrant has access to all of the available public knowledge process innovations from
the spillover process. In addition, entrants possess some private innovations developed earlier or
during the construction phase of its manufacturing plant. We assume that new ﬁrms generally
enter at relatively lower eﬃciency levels than incumbents to capture the fact that hazard rates of
exit decline with the age of the ﬁrm (See Dunne, Robertson, and Samuelson, 1988). Speciﬁcally,
new ﬁrms will enter, on average, with fewer private innovations than incumbents:









where ipEN represents the number of private innovations of a new entrant. The left side implies
that new ﬁrms are bringing some new ideas while the right-side, e ipm, is the equilibrium average
(over the long-run) number of private innovations held by incumbent ﬁrms. If new ﬁrms entered
at higher levels than incumbents, then incumbents would be more likely to die than entrants
producing the counterfactual result that incumbents have a higher hazard rate of exit than new
ﬁrms. If new ﬁrms only entered with the public stock of knowledge, this would preclude them
from ever being able to capture a large initial market share. What this allows for is the possibility
that when incumbents fail to innovate, new ﬁrms have the opportunity to immediately establish
themselves as the new leader. This possibility occurs only rarely. Most of the time new ﬁrms
will enter with a small market share relative to existing incumbents.





Marginal costs fall at the rate η with each additional innovation. Z is a scale parameter on costs
6 If all information were permanently private, a leading ﬁrm could innovate a suﬃcient number of times such that
t h ec o s tt oan e wﬁrm of acquiring enough innovations to generate positive proﬁts would make entry prohibitively
high.
11which we use below to calibrate the model to match the mean size of ﬁrms measured by employees
as reported in Hart and Oulton (1996). Z captures the unit labor costs of ﬁrms relative to the
price of the ﬁnal output good. Because all ﬁrms have access to the public stock of knowledge,
what diﬀerentiates them in terms of marginal cost and market share is their private stocks of
innovations. Firms with a greater number of privately held innovations enjoy a cost advantage
over rivals. The cost advantage generates higher proﬁts and the motive for engaging in process
R&D.
This speciﬁcation for the evolution of marginal costs and innovation has several notable fea-
tures. First, process innovation will sustain growth. Marginal costs of production continually
decline and go to zero as t →∞ . Since it is the relative marginal costs that matter to ﬁrms’
proﬁts as shown in (8), the absolute level of the marginal costs (or total stock of innovations) is
irrelevant to the decisions of a ﬁrm. For a given set of marginal costs across an industry, even
when marginal costs are arbitrarily close to zero, ﬁrms will continue to acquire innovations to
increase their proﬁts by improving their relative position. Second, in contrast to Ericson-Pakes,
the spillover process does not change the marginal costs of active ﬁrms, but it does lower the costs
of potential entrants because the stock of publicly available innovations continually grows. This
feature allows for potential entrants to remain within striking distance of the incumbents. Hence,
the contribution of private innovations to the public stock is an externality that beneﬁts the pool
of potential entrants.7
The stock of private innovations held by incumbent ﬁrm k increases through successful R&D.
T h er o l eo fR & Di sg i v e nb y :
ipkm,t+1 = ipkmt + υkmt (13)
7 In the speciﬁcation presented here, there are no spillovers between active ﬁrms which contrasts with the
empirical evidence (e.g. Griliches, 1998). The spillover from private to the public stock of knowledge is necessary
for continual growth because it enables new ﬁrms to enter at levels competitive with incumbents. The model can
be adjusted to account for diﬀusion between incumbent ﬁrms. Doing so would enable analysis of the role of secrecy
and lead time and how they interact with market structure. Overall, we do not belive it would not change the
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xkmt is the level of investment undertaken by a ﬁrm at time t. Note that the R&D production
function does not vary with ﬁrm size, i.e. large ﬁrms do not possess an inherent advantage in
successfully conducting R&D. We do not need to assume advantages owing to size to generate
R&D spending distributions that match the highly skewed distributions in the data (see Laincz
2004a). This assumption is consistent with the arguments of Cohen and Klepper (1992) among
others that there are no diﬀerences in the productivity of research investment owing to ﬁrm size.
The parameter a governs the productivity of R&D and is interpreted as measuring the tech-
nological opportunity and basic state of science. We assume this to be constant across products.
Clearly, the level of R&D productivity will be an important parameter for variation in the ﬁrm
size distribution. Higher levels of a generate greater potential for any one ﬁrm to extend its
technological advantage and generate greater variance in ﬁrm sizes. We explore the consequences
of higher and lower technological opportunity on the ﬁrm size distribution in section 5.
The combination of the two stochastic variables, R&D and diﬀusion, in conjunction with the
solution to the dynamic equilibrium results in an upper bound on how much of a lead ﬁrms
will actually gain over potentially new ﬁrms in equilibrium. Because returns to investment are
decreasing when marginal costs are relatively low, ﬁrms will enter a “coasting” state and choose
not to invest because the gains eventually become outweighed by the costs.8
3.1.3 Dynamic Equilibrium
Let snm be the number of ﬁrms with i private innovations producing product m and deﬁne the
vector sm =[ snm] which describes the market structure at any point in time. There are two
types of ﬁrms facing diﬀerent problems: incumbents and potential entrants. Incumbents are
8 See Ericson and Pakes (1995) for a detailed discussion of the coasting states.
13either producing for the market or choosing to exit. Their problem is characterized by comparing
the expected net present value of investment in R&D against a positive liquidation value given by
φ. Potential entrants compare an outside alternative, ψ, against the net present value of entering
minus sunk costs of establishing production facilities denoted by χ.B o t h φ and χ are assumed
constant across time and equal across ﬁrms.
An incumbent’s intertemporal decision can be described by the following Bellman equation
where time subscripts are replaced with a prime indicating a future value and all others are
current:
V I
km(ipkm,s m)=m a x
½












where the I superscript refers to the value of an incumbent. If the ﬁrm chooses to exit it receives
the liquidation value φ,o t h e r w i s et h eﬁrm receives current period proﬁts minus its investment
level in R&D, xkm at a cost of c per unit plus the discounted expected value conditional on future
market structure. The future market structure depends on the ﬁrm’s current number of private
innovations, the current market structure, and the vector of investment xm =[ xnm] for all ﬁrms.
1/(1 + r) is the common discount factor facing all ﬁrms. The expectation sign reﬂects the fact
that the ﬁrm is assigning probability weights via the transition matrix of the market structure
moving from its current state to all possible states. These include the probability of a spillover,
the probability the ﬁrm itself will be successful in R&D, the probability of all other ﬁrms being
successful, and the probabilities of entry and exit. If the solution to the expected discounted
proﬁts is less than the liquidation value, φ,t h eﬁrm chooses to exit the market and sell its capital.
Accordingly, investment is zero for an exiting ﬁrm.
A potential entrepreneur may enter a product market and establish production and R&D
facilities. If entry is optimal, the entrepreneur incurs a sunk entry cost. Production and sales do
not begin until the following period. The Bellman equation resembles that for incumbents with
14few changes:
V EN(ipEN,s m)=m a x
½










where the EN superscript refers to entrants and the future value corresponds to that of being an
incumbent in the next period. ψ measures the opportunity cost of entering and χ represents the
sunk entry costs.
The investment strategy of ﬁrms derives from the ﬁrst order conditions on the above. Let
C1(ip0
km +1 ,s 0
m) denote the expected value of the ﬁrm conditional on successful innovation and
C2(ip0
km,s 0
m) the expected value if it fails to innovate. We can then rewrite the Bellman equation
for incumbents as:9
V I





















From this, the ﬁrst-order condition yields the following policy function:














Since investment cannot be negative, the ﬁrm chooses the value maximizing level of R&D in-
vestment subject to a non-negativity constraint. Investment in R&D rises with the expected
marginal gain in value, C1 −C2, and falls with the discount rate, r, and the cost of investment, c.
The productivity of R&D, captured by a,h a so ﬀsetting eﬀects. As a itself rises it increases the
probability of successful R&D and, hence, a higher value. That imparts an incentive to increase
investment. However, the higher the level of a the less investment is required to achieve any given
probability of success reducing the incentive to invest.
The numerical algorithm employed uses value function iteration to solve for the space of values
given by all possible combinations of ﬁrms and private innovations. From the value function,
9 We only present the investment function for the incumbent to save on space.
15the policy functions, including the entry and exit decisions, are fairly straightforward to extract.
From the solutions, we can simulate our product markets and industry, comparing the results with
the empirical literature.
4 Firm Size Distribution
4.1 The Ergodic Distribution
In our initial runs of the model, we speciﬁed ﬁve product markets with diﬀerent levels of demand.
T h es t a t es p a c ec o n s t r a i n t sw eu s eh a v eam a x i m u mo fs i xﬁrms per product market and each
ﬁrm can hold up to 30 private innovations. To ensure that the state space boundaries do not
drive the results we choose our demand parameters such that when six ﬁrms are in the market
they are making negative proﬁts. For the maximum number of private innovations, we check in
the simulations whether any ﬁrm attempts to obtain more private innovations than exist in the
state space and make adjustments accordingly.
TABLE 1: Baseline parameter values for simulations.
Parameter Symbol Value
Discount Rate facing ﬁrms 1/(1 + r) 1/1.08
Rate of Technological Spillover δ 0.7
Productivity of R&D Investment a 3
Sunk Entry Costs Xe 0.2
Cost per unit of R&D Spending c 1
Liquidation Value φ 0.1
Outside Alternative Value ψ 0.2
Rate of Decrease in Marginal Costs η 0.05
Unit Cost of Labor Z 127.65
16The choice of parameters is as follows: We set the discount rate to 1/1.08 as an approximation
of the average cost of capital for ﬁrms. The rate of technological spillovers, δ,i ss e tt o0 . 7s u c h
that knowledge enters the public pool roughly one-and-a-half years after discovery. This ﬁts with
the empirical estimates of Mansﬁeld (1981) on imitation time. Cost of a unit of R&D spending is
set to one unit of the ﬁnal good. The liquidation value and outside opportunity cost are chosen
to be small to prevent them from dominating the incentives ﬁrms face. Ex post, we ﬁnd that the
liquidation value is about 7.5% of the average ﬁrm value, while the opportunity cost is roughly
15% of average ﬁrm value. We calibrate the unit cost of production parameter, Z,t om a t c h
the mean log size as measured by employment reported in Hart and Oulton (1996). The other
parameters including the productivity of R&D investment, a, sunk costs of entry, Xe,a n dt h e
rate of decrease in marginal costs, η are set to 3, 0.2, and 5% respectively and the values follow
Laincz (2004a). These parameters, and the rate of knowledge diﬀusion, will be allow to vary in
the following section to determine their impact on the ﬁrm size distribution.
In our ﬁrst comparison of the model with the data, we compute the ergodic distribution by
simulating the model.10 From the distribution found in the simulations, we weight the observed
outcomes by their probability of occurrence to generate the ergodic distributions for various size
measures. It is important to note that the comparison here with the data is not direct. We take
advantage of the fact that through simulations we can generate the probability distribution of the
market structures. Empirical studies use a cross-section of ﬁr m sa tap o i n ti nt i m e( w et u r nt o
this analysis later) while the ergodic distribution shows the probabilities of a market structure
occurring at a point in time. That is, the ergodic distribution is generated as a time series, but
it reveals what the expected cross-section would look like.
Table 2 shows the results of the baseline parameterization compared with the statistics found
in Hart and Oulton (1996) who use subsets (50 to 80 thousand companies) of a large database
10 The simulation runs the model for 25,000 periods. In order to avoid any bias caused by the speciﬁcation of
the initial market structure, we simulate it ﬁrst for 10,000 periods and ﬁnd the modal market structure. The main
simulation then uses the modal market structure as its starting point.
17that includes very small ﬁrms in the sample. They ﬁnd that the distribution of the natural
log of various size measures (employment, sales, and net assets) exhibit positive skewness (long
right-tails) and peaked (leptokurtic) distributions relative to the normal distribution. We report
analogous measures based on our model. Sales are easily computed by extracting the quantities
and prices while we use ﬁrm values, V I, for net assets. All values below are reported in natural
logs.
TABLE 2: Distribution Statistics11
Normal H&O Model H&O Model H&O Model
Measure Distribution Emp. Emp. Sales Sales Net Assets Net Assets
Mean - 3.1582 3.1582 7.2015 5.1638 5.5539 5.0285
Std. Dev. - 1.5197 0.4865 1.6628 0.5052 1.9635 1.3010
Skewness 0 0.7487 0.3912 0.1932 0.1079 0.4366 0.8942
Kurtosis 3 4.5794 3.9685 6.1876 4.3851 4.835 3.1772
The model does reasonably well in matching Hart and Oulton’s data. However, the standard
deviations of the size measures are considerably smaller. This discrepancy is not surprising since
the model is designed for a particular industry whereas the empirical estimates cover a large range
of industries which would generate greater size variation. The normal distribution, which would
result from Gibrat’s Law, would yield a skewness measure of 0 and kurtosis of 3. The skewness
coeﬃcients in both the data and the model indicate a long-right tail and the model produces a
distribution more leptokurtic than the normal in line with the empirical results.
Figures 5-7 show the distributions in levels (a) and in logs (b). The distributions in levels, for
all the three proxies considered, exhibit longer right tails, especially for the net assets distribution.
The size range accumulating the higher probability mass lies signiﬁcantly to the left of the mean
size in all the distributions. The distributions for both the log of sales and log of net assets are
11 H&O refers to the results reported in Hart and Oulton (1996). Note that they report the kurtosis in the
original paper after subtracting oﬀ three such that the normal distribution would generate a kurtosis measure of
zero. Here we report the fourth moment without subtracting oﬀ three.
18clearly not bell shaped, but rather appear to be slightly skewed to the right and exhibit thicker
tails and higher peaks than the standard normal. The distribution of the log of employment
exhibits less variance as indicated in Table 2, but shows some skewness and leptokurtosis.
4.2 Cross-Sectional Growth-Size Properties
While the above shows that the ergodic distribution of the models reasonably match the observed
data in terms of deviations from Gibrat’s Law, we now turn to examining the growth-size rela-
tionships of the simulated model. To extract cross-sectional data comparable to that used in the
empirical literature, we simulate the model ﬁve times for 5,000 periods each and extract the ﬁnal
periods from each run.12 That provides us with simulated panel data to test the growth-size
relationship. Overall, the simulation produces 137 ﬁrms over the last two periods. Of those,
11 exited immediately, 22 new ﬁrms entered in the ﬁrst period, 23 exited the following period,
with 12 more entries in the subsequent period. The average entry and exit rates were 0.214 and
0.182 respectively. That leaves 69 ﬁrms that produced positive output in both periods. Table
3 provides sample statistics for the data in the initial period on mean size, variance in size, en-
try, and exit. The measures are largely the same as in Table 2, allow the kurtosis measure for
employment is exceptionally high. If we were to simulate repeated times and take averages the
number would undoubtedly come down, though part of the increase follows from removing new
entrants and exiting ﬁrms to generate a balanced panel.
TABLE 3: Summary Statistics in Natural Logs
12 To prevent the variance of the size of the ﬁrms from being dominated by the overall growth process, we shut
down the increments to the public stock of knowledge except for the periods we extracted for analysis.
19Size Measure Employment. Sales Net Assets
Observations 69 69 69
Average 3.558 5.098 5.066
Variance 0.238 0.141 1.485
Skewness 2.517 0.443 1.246
Kurtosis 12.190 3.543 4.925
T a b l e4p r o v i d e st h er e s u l t so ft h er e g r e s s i o n so ft h ef o l l o w i n gf o r m :
lnyt = β lnyt−1 +  t
where yt is the log of the various size measures. We report the results using robust standard
errors, but even without using them the results are hardly changed. The ﬁnal column shows the
t-statistic for the null hypothesis that β =1 .
TABLE 4: Regression Results
Firms Size Measure Obs. Coeﬃcient Std. Error R2 H0 : β =1
All Employment 69 0.969 0.008 0.99 14.28***
Sales 69 0.964 0.006 0.99 37.00***
Net Assets 69 0.933 0.014 0.98 21.94***
Large Employment 3613 0.993 0.008 0.99 2.17
Sales 35 0.968 0.006 0.99 24.36***
Net Assets 35 0.944 0.016 0.99 11.83***
Small Employment 33 0.937 0.013 0.99 23.26***
Sales 34 0.956 0.011 0.99 15.14***
Net Assets 34 0.911 0.027 0.97 11.24***
Note: * Signiﬁcant at the 10% level; ** for the 5% level; and *** for the 1% level.
13 For employment, several ﬁrms were exactly at the median. We report the results with those ﬁrms included
in the large category. Changing their designation to small does not alter the results.
20Hall’s (1987) estimates for β as applied to employment across three diﬀerent samples were
consistently 0.99 and signiﬁcantly less than one.14 Evans (1987) on the other hand ﬁnds values
for β that range between 0.93 and 0.97 for employment. The model here also generates a coeﬃcient
less than one, below Hall’s estimates, but in accord with those of Evans’. The R-squared’s are
exceedingly high. However, since there are only two simple stochastic processes in the model and
nothing akin to demand shocks, it is not surprising in the least that past size is a good predictor
of size in the short-run. Over more extended periods of time we would expect this relationship
to weaken for the model because of the Markov Perfect nature of the equilibrium. Yet, the
main result here is consistent with what the empirical literature ﬁnds in that their is a negative
growth-size relationship.
In the bottom portion of the table we split our sample between large and small ﬁrms deﬁned
as above or equal to the median of the sample or below it. Empirically we have seen that Gibrat’s
Law works better for the large ﬁrms. Our results show a similar pattern. The estimated β’s are
consistently higher for the large ﬁrm sample. In fact, for the employment size measure we cannot
reject equality with one at the 10% level. For the three size measures we also tested for the
equality of the coeﬃcients between the large and small ﬁrm subsets. For employment we reject
equality at the 1% signiﬁcance level, but we cannot reject equality for the other two measures.
In order to test for serial correlation we reduce our sample to those ﬁrms surviving in three
consecutive periods for a balanced panel. The previous tests only had 69 observations and after
one more period 23 exited, leaving only 46 remaining ﬁrms. The speciﬁcation is similar to Kumar












Persistence in the shocks will show up as a positive value for γ, while the coeﬃcient on the log of
the previous size corresponds to 1+β in the previous regression. We ﬁnd that the coeﬃcients
14 In addition to rejecting β =1for employment, we also tested β =0 .990, the smallest value reported in Hall
(Table II). We reject the null with a t-statistic of 7.29.
21for β and γ, even for the small sample, are signiﬁcant at the 5% level (though the former just
barely). Their estimated values are -0.0157 (or 0.9843 for comparison with Table 4) and 1.257
for the latter.
The positive value of γ indicates serial correlation which comes as no surprise given the design
of the model. There are several contributing factors to serial correlation in our model. First,
successful ﬁrms seek to build on and protect any technological advantage and thus invest more
heavily than small ﬁrms. In addition, a growing ﬁrm pushes rivals ﬁrms closer to the exit
threshold. Thus, the growing ﬁrm will get a subsequent additional increase in market share with
the increase in the likelihood of rivals’ exit decisions. These processes of ﬁrm dynamics eﬀectively
embed serial correlation in error terms that cannot account for innovative behavior and expected
future changes in market share conditional on them. The results suggest that serial correlation
should weaken in empirical studies if appropriate controls for R&D expenditure and innovations
of existing and rival ﬁrms are included. We leave this hypothesis for future empirical work.
O n en o t eo nt h em a g n i t u d eo fs e r i a lc o r r e lation is required here. Our estimate of γ is an order
of magnitude larger than that found in either Singh and Whittington (1975) or Kumar (1985)
who ﬁnd values of approximately 0.3 and 0.l2 respectively. The distinguishing feature is in the
diﬀerence in time periods. Those authors use a much longer time frame, 10 to 12 years, compared
with our simulated data which corresponds to roughly one year based on the user cost of capital
we specify. Because we know that the model will predict serial correlation that declines over
time, again due to the Markov perfect nature of the equilibrium, we do not pursue that issue any
further here. Suﬃce it to say, that the model does generate serial correlation in the errors when
using the basic regression model found in the growth-size regressions related to Gibrat’s Law.
Finally, we look at the variance in growth rates across ﬁrm sizes. Again, we separate our
simulated sample by the median. Table 5 shows the standard deviations in growth rates for the
t o t a ls a m p l ea n dl a r g ea n ds m a l lﬁrms according to the three size measures. In all three cases
the variance in the growth rate of the small ﬁrms is larger than that of the large ﬁrms. The ﬁnal
22column reports the F-statistic for the variance ratio test for equality of the standard deviations.
We can reject equality at the 5% level based on the employment measure and at the 1% level for
sales, but we fail to reject equality for measuring size by ﬁrm net assets. The latter also has the
highest level of the standard deviation. Overall, the results are encouraging in the sense that,
again the model replicates empirical ﬁndings. Naturally, we could produce more simulations and
increase the size of our samples to ensure we reject equality for the standard deviation in the
growth rate of net assets, but that seems overkill to us at this point.
TABLE 5: Tests of Standard Deviation of Growth Rates by Size Class
Size Measure Obs. Total Large Small H0 : σ1 = σ2
Employment 36/33 0.251 0.192 0.288 2.25**
Sales 35/34 0.270 0.204 0.326 2.55***
Net Assets 35/34 0.630 0.596 0.671 1.27
Note: * Signiﬁcant at the 10% level; ** for the 5% level; and *** for the 1% level.
To summarize the section, we ﬁnd that the model is able to replicate the empirical studies
in two ways. First, it can generate a ﬁrm size distribution with the higher moments deviating
from the log-normal distribution in the same direction as actual distributions. Secondly, in the
cross-section the model generates a negative ﬁrm size-growth relationship, decreasing variance in
t h eg r o w t hr a t ew i t hﬁrm size, and serial correlation, all found in the data. Based on the above we
feel reasonably conﬁdent in using the model to understand how underlying structural parameters
aﬀect the overall ﬁrm size distribution.
5 Variation in the Firm Size Distribution
This section is in progress. The previous section established that the model reasonably matches
the data in terms of the ﬁrm size distribution and in its cross-sectional empirics. Now we ask how
the moments of the ﬁrm size distribution change with underlying structural parameters suggested
in the literature. Speciﬁcally we will vary the following parameters: sunk costs, ﬁxed costs,
23productivity of R&D, rate of spillovers, and the rate of decline in marginal costs. Of interest is
whether the variations the model generates are in accord with cross-industry variation uncovered
in the empirical literature.
6 Summary
Understanding the forces that generate diﬀerences in the ﬁrm size distribution enables us to
identify the forces that generate more or less concentration across industries. This study provides
a model for undertaking this task. We show that the model can replicate the ﬁrm size distributions
reported in the literature. In addition, it can be used to replicate the growth-size relationships
of more recent interest.
The remaining work, in this preliminary and incomplete version, goes after the main question.
We intend to examine how variations in critical parameters such as sunk costs of entry and
technological opportunity aﬀect the ﬁrm size distribution and compare those results with the
empirical results on cross-industry diﬀerences.
We should also note some missing elements in our framework that could be incorporated in
future work. We have already mentioned that the model could be extended to allow for strategic
interaction across products in addition to the within product market strategic interaction. We
doubt such an extension would signiﬁcantly change the results, but that remains to be seen.
Secondly, merger activity is one of the major concerns in the empirical literature on the ﬁrm size
distribution (for example see Kumar, 1985, and Dunne and Hughes, 1994). Our model can be
extended to handle mergers by combining it with Gowrisankaran’s (1999) work on merger activity
in the context of the Ericson-Pakes framework. Finally, most empirical work refers to the model
of Jovanovic (1982) as a theoretical base. It features a passive learning process wherein each ﬁrm
is uncertain about its true costs leading to a Bayesian learning behavior over time and endogenous
exit. The model here relies on R&D success and diﬀusion of knowledge to generate entry, growth,
survival, and exit. Clearly, there are other elements of uncertainty in the real world, especially
24with regards to new ﬁrms. More could be done to capture the risks that entrepreneurs face such
as uncertainty of true costs as in Jovanovic. That would allow us to explore how the rise of
venture capital and lowering of entry barriers, other than the sunk costs discussed here, aﬀect the
ﬁrm size distribution and its evolution.
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yFigure 5b:  Log Employment Distribution






































yFigure 6b: Log Sales Distribution






































yFigure 7b:  Log Values Distribution
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